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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-86.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission improperly determined that Petitioners were not
dependents under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-71.

2.

Whether or not the Industrial Commission properly applied the law in determining burden
3

of proof for establishing dependency.
3.

Whether or not the Industrial Commission committed error by failing to construe the
workers' compensation statute liberally in favor of the Petitioners.

4.

Whether the Industrial Commission's decision and order are supported by adequate
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

5.

Whether the Petitioners' due process rights have been denied by virtue of the Industrial
Commission and Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact or if they are arbitrarily
capricious or wholly without cause.

6.

Whether Temporary Total Disability Compensation had accrued and should have been
awarded.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the Industrial Commission. The case arose from an
industrial accident occurring on May 17, 1994 when Barney Caporoz was injured while in the
course and scope of his employment with Uninsured Handyman Willie. Mr. Caporoz died on
December 17, 1994 after being in a coma for six months. The Petitioners are sister and half-sister
to the Decedent who resided with Decedent at the time of the injury. Petitioners are claiming they
are entitled to workers compensation benefits by virtue of their dependency upon the support and
maintenance of the Decedent.

Course of the Proceedings
1.

On October 4, 1994, Petitioner Verna Caporoz filed a Protection of Rights claim for and
on behalf of Barney Caporoz.

2.

On May 5, 1995, Petitioner Verna Caporoz filed a claim for dependent benefits and burial
expenses with the Industrial Commission.
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3.

A hearing was held before Judge Donald L. George of the Industrial Commission.

4.

Judge Donald L. George signed a prepared Order on April 3, 1996.

5.

A Motion for Review was timely filed on May 3, 1996.

Disposition at the Industrial Commission
The Industrial Commission denied the Motion for Review on October 30, 1996
determining that Petitioners were not entitled to Dependent benefits.

BACKGROUND FACTS
L

On May 17, 1994, Barney Caporoz was working for Handy Man Willie, an Uninsured
Employer when he was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 1, page 2, Industrial
Commission Findings of Fact, page 1.

2.

Barney Caporoz was in a coma until December 17, 1994 when he died from the May 17,
1994 accident. See Medical Record Exhibit and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact
pagel.

3.

At the time of the accident, Barney Caporoz resided with his sister Verna Caporoz and
half-sister, Roxsanne Clastimodo. See Judge George Findings of Fact Paragraph 4, page 3
and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 2.

4.

On October 4, 1994, Applicant Verna Caporoz filed a Claim for Protection of Rights as it
deals with her deceased brother, Barney Caporoz. She indicated that at the time of the
injury, her brother was in a coma as a result of an industrial injury.

5.

On May 5, 1995, Applicant filed a Claim for Dependents' Benefits and/or burial benefits.
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See Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 3,
6.

In 1988, the Petitioners moved from Hawaii to Utah to Plain City. Three years later, in
1992, the Deceased moved into a rental home of his sisters, the Applicants. See Judge
George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4, page 3, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact,
page 2.

7.

In 1992, the Petitioners were paying rent of $275.00 per month. The Landlord increased
the rent to $400.00 per month and the sisters needed assistance and support to pay the
rent and other expenses. See Findings of Fact by Judge Donald L. George Paragraph 5,
page 3, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2.

8.

The sisters testified they could not maintain the rent in said home without the assistance of
their brother. Had the Deceased not moved in with his sisters, they could not afford said
home. See Judge George Findings of Fact, paragraph 8, page 3.

9.

After Barney Caporoz moved in, he purchased the family two additional vehicles, living
room furniture, and other furniture. See Judge George Findings of Fact, paragraphs 10,
11, 12, page 3 and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2.

10.

He further increased the lifestyle of the Petitioners by paying for all recreation, taking the
Petitioners to Lagoon and Wendover. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 13,
page 4 and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2.

11.

The Deceased also lessened expenses by performing all of the maintenance on the home
and on the vehicles. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 14, page 4 and
Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 2.

12.

He further contributed to the Petitioners support and maintenance by purchasing food.
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See Judge George Findings of Fact Paragraph 14, page 4 and Industrial Commission
Findings of Fact, page 2.
13.

The Deceased provided $400.00 per month to pay for bills and paid $150.00 toward the
rent. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 14, page 4 and Industrial
Commission Findings of Fact page 2.

14.

The Deceased also increased the Petitioners lifestyle by entering into a contract for cable
TV. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 22, page 4 and Industrial Commission
Findings of Fact page 2.

15.

The Deceased helped pay for utilities including the phone. See Judge George Findings of
Fact, Paragraph 16, page 4, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2.

16.

The applicants testified that the Deceased was the man of the family. Hearing Transcript
pages 14, 22.

17.

The parties held a joint bank account. See Hearing Transcript page 45, 46 and Industrial
Commission Findings of Fact page 3.

18.

The Applicants both testified they enjoyed the relationship and arrangement. They had
hope to continue this relationship and arrangement for considerable time. See testimony
ofVernaCaporoz.

19.

Following the demise of the Deceased, the applicants could not maintain their lifestyle and
standard of living. The Petitioners were forced to sell the couches, vehicles, loveseat,
lounge chair, waterbed, TV and Roxsanne's bed. Furthermore, they could not afford cable
nor go on any vacations. The telephone was shut off. See Judge George Findings of Fact
Paragraphs 22 and 23, pages 4 and 5, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 3.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Workers Compensation Act of Utah intends that family members of a deceased
worker receive benefits if the individual family member can show that dependency existed
between the deceased and the family member. Dependency is based upon a question of fact and
the underlying circumstances, and is not limited to an absolute dollar standard. Should
dependency exist, Utah Law provides that accrued benefits are payable to the dependent or the
estate, and the accrued benefits do not terminate due to the passing of the deceased.
The Applicant's in this case are dependents. In reviewing the Findings of Fact one can
only come to the conclusion that dependency existed and any benefits that had accrued from the
date of the accident to the date of death, are due and payable to the dependents in accordance to
Utah Law.
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20.

The applicants have not eaten as well as when the Deceased was alive. See Hearing
Transcript pages 24 and 48.

21.

Both Applicants testified that they depended financially upon the Deceased. See Judge
George Findings of Fact Paragraph 8, page 3.

ARGUMENT
The Petitioners fall within the Statutory meaning of Dependents.
The Workers Compensation Act of Utah intended to provide benefits to family of a
Deceased employee. The Applicants, both of whom are related to the Deceased, fall squarely in
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-71 in that Verna is a sister to the Deceased. In Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-71 it specifically states: " No person shall be considered as a dependent unless he or she is a
member of the family of the Deceased employee, or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal
descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. (Emphasis added) Roxsanne is a half-sister and is
specifically included in the statute. Half brothers and half sisters shall be included in the words
"brother or sister" as above used. (Emphasis added)
Petitioners have the burden to prove that they are dependents. In Larsen's Section 63 it
states:
"Dependency in fact must be established in order to qualify for death benefits in all
cases except those involving a conclusive presumption of dependency. Proof of
actual dependency does not require a showing that the claimant relied on the
deceased for the bare necessities of life and without that contribution would have
been reduced to destitution; it is sufficient to show that the deceased's
contributions were looked to by claimant for the maintenance of claimant's
accustomed standard of living. Hence a claimant may be dependent although
receiving other income from claimant's own work, from property, or from other
persons on whom claimant is also dependent. Usually, actual contribution to
8

claimant's support is enough to establish dependency without evidence of legal
obligation to support.
In LPS Hospital v. Industrial Commission of Utah 901 P.2d 1164 (1987), the court defined
"dependency". It states:
"dependency within the meaning of our workers' compensation
statutes does not mean absolute dependency for the necessities of
life, but instead it means a need for and reliance on the worker's
income to support and maintain the alleged dependent in
accordance with his accustomed station in life."

Larsen further indicates that "no absolute dollar standard by which to test either the
magnitude of claimant's need or the magnitude of decedent's help in meeting that need. In fact
there is Utah case law that shows a determination of dependency when the applicant was only
receiving between $1.00 to $3.00 per month from the deceased.
In Sizemore v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 288 P.2d 788 (1955), the court has
suggested a 2-part test in deciding dependency. The Sizemore court has indicated the following:
(l)(a) Dependency is primarily a question of fact, except in those
cases covered by statutory presumption. While it is difficult to
fashion a general definition to cover all situations which might
constitute dependency, it should appear that at the time of the
injury:
(1) There existed some family or other social relationship giving
rise to a legal or moral obligation to support; and
(2) One or more of the following should be answered affirmatively:
a.
That claimant relied upon Deceased in whole or in part for
support or maintenance.
b.
That it was reasonably necessary for the Deceased to render some financial
assistance to claimant in order for him to maintain his accustomed standard of
living; or
9

C.
That claimant would in all probability have received some assistance from
Deceased, had he continued to live.
In this case, the Applicants fulfill the Sizemore test. The Applicants had a family
relationship and the Deceased assumed a moral obligation to support. The applicants relied upon
the Deceased in part for support or maintenance and it was reasonable for the Deceased to render
said assistance to his sisters. Had the Deceased not past away, he would continue to help the
Applicants.
This case patterns after Roller Coaster Co. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 709
(1948). In Roller Coaster, the Deceased, James Y. Hess, lived with his mother. He had paid
varying amounts of money for Applicants purchasing clothing, school expense and groceries. The
Deceased also maintained the garden and home. The Court specifically said "The Commission
correctly found that the mother and minor sister were partly dependent on decedent for support at
the time of his death".
The Defendants and the Industrial Commission rely upon Farnsworth v. Industrial
Commission, 534 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975). Farnsworth re-emphases the Sizemore tests as indicated
the Rigby v. Industrial Commission. 286 P. 628 (1930), but denied benefits anyway. Farnsworth
can be distinguished because of it's facts. In Farnsworth. the Father of the Deceased was making
a claim. Even though the facts do not specify, it is understood that the Father was not living with
the Deceased. The Deceased did not provide financial support. The Deceased made a claim for
dependent benefits based on the fact that the Deceased provided transportation to the VA
Hospital and to doctor appointments. The Deceased also performed yard-work and took his
father on errands, "mainly to get him out of the house". The Applicant sometimes reimbursed or
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paid the Deceased for his services. The Farnsworth court denied benefits because it was found
that the "activities was not the type contemplated and intended within the meaning of the Workers
Compensation Act". The Farnsworth court found that in order to be "dependent", the
dependency must be based upon support. Specifically it states: "Case law (is) consistently limited
to those fact situations wherein deceased contributed financial assistance or comparable assistance
such as growing food, which was used in supporting the dependent". In the case at hand, the
Petitioners were relying upon the financial as well as moral and emotional support that their
brother offered and gave them.
The Industrial Commission has indicated a wrong standard whether Petitioners are
dependents. Specifically, the Industrial Commission indicates on page four:
"While Mr Caporoz carried his share of household expenses, he did
not subsidize his sisters' expenses. To the contrary, it appears that
Mr. Caporoz and his sisters had developed a system of sharing
common expenses, but that each of them paid their own personal
expenses. While Mr. Caporoz may have occasionally treated his
sisters to movies, admission to Lagoon or lodging and meals at
Wendover, the Industrial Commission does not consider such items
as significant to the support and maintenance of Ms. Caporoz or
Ms. Clastimodo. (Emphasis added)

The Industrial Commission has inserted terms such as "significant or subsidize" in
determining whether dependency was necessary. These terms go beyond what was indicated or
even contemplated by prior case law. Sizemore and Farnsworth were quite clear in determining
dependency. Furthermore, to now insert such terms as stated above would go contrary to public
policy or the intent of the Workers Compensation laws. It must be remembered that there cannot
be an absolute dollar standard by which to test either the magnitude of claimant's need or the
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magnitude of decedent's help in meeting those needs. See Larsen Section 63.10. Moreover, the
applicants may have other substantial sources of support from work, from property, or from other
persons on whom claimant is also dependent. The test is whether the Petitioners looked to the
Decedent "for maintenance of an accustomed standard of living". It is clear from the facts that
the Petitioners did in fact look to the Decedent for support. The Petitioners had Decedent pay the
equivalent of the entire rent per month. The Decedent further provided food. The Decedent
maintained the premises and automobiles. The Decedent purchased two other automobiles. The
Decedent then treated the Petitioners to vacation and recreation. The Petitioners lifestyles were
drastically changed when Decedent died. The automobiles were sold. The furniture was sold.
The telephone and cable TV were cut off. No more recreation events or vacations.
The purpose of the workers compensation statute is to alleviate the financial hardship on
individual employees and those dependent upon them by spreading the cost of an injury
throughout the industry that employs the worker. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
364 P.2d 1020 (1961), Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885 (1945). To further
the purpose of the act, any doubt concerning the right of compensation must be resolved in favor
of the injured worker and his dependents. See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P. 2d 676
(1990), J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (1983), Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (1981), McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (1977), Long
v. Western States Refining Co., 384 P.2d 1015 (1963), M & K v. Industrial Commission. 189
P.2d at 134 (1949). If there are any questions concerning whether there is dependency, one must
resolve it in favor of an award. See Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 974 (1993) and
Heaton. The Industrial Commission has failed to resolve any doubt concerning the right of
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compensation in favor of the Petitioners.

Is the estate of the Deceased entitled to an award of Temporary Total Disability
Compensation from the date of his injury to the time of his death?
In the case of Parker v. Industrial Commission. P.2d 278 (1935), the Utah Supreme Court
had the opportunity to re-examine its position in the Heiselt Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
197 P. 589 (1921) case. The Parker court held:
The payment of compensation is, in a sense, a disability wage, and is earned by
operation of law. The conditions making it payable all pertaining, the employee is
entitled to it just as much as he is entitled to wages earned by contract. As
disability payments are "earned" they become vested, and if the employee dies
before they are paid, his estate is entitled to them.
In distinguishing it's prior decision in Heiselt the Court in Parker stated:
In all of these cases, including the Heiselt Construction Co. Case, the question
was to whether "unaccrued" payments for partial permanent disability passed to
the estate. The question did not involve payments which had accrued for
temporary total disability. . . . It is clear the court in that case did not intend to lay
down any rule to the effect that compensation payments accrued at the time of the
death would not pass to the estate.
The Parker Court further attempted to distinguish Heiselt by noting that in the case that
"No award had been made for permanent partial disability for the loss of parts of four fingers until
after the death of the decedent". The Court went on in interpreting the predecessor to Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-68 to find that:
The language of R.S. Utah 1933, 42-1074, that compensation shall be paid only to
employees or their dependents, is for the protection of the employees and their
dependents and was not meant to deprive the estate of the deceased employee of
compensation which was due and payable to him during his lifetime.
Thus, in cases of temporary total disability compensation which has accrued, there is no
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lapse at the time of the injured workers death and such benefits would be payable to his heirs.
The deceased's benefits had accrued. The Industrial Commission has determined by rule when
benefits have been deemed and payable. In Rule 568-1-12(1), it states that "Temporary Total
compensation shall be due and payable within 21 days of the date of the accident". A review of
Parker reveals that even though the facts of the case involved benefits which were awarded by the
Commission prior to death, the language clearly indicates that benefits are "earned" and "vested"
at the time they are due. The Court defined the point in time when benefits accrue as follows:
The payment of compensation is, in a sense, a disability wage, and is earned by
operation of law. The conditions making it payable all pertaining, the employee is
entitled to it just as much as he is entitled to wages earned by contract. As
disability payments are "earned" they become vested, and if the employee dies
before they are paid, his estate is entitled to them.
This is completely consistent with the fact that total temporary disability is actually wage
replacement. As in this case, Mr. Caporoz, who was a wage earner prior to his accident, his
dependents enjoyed and depended upon the wages he was bringing home prior to the accident.
Had Mr. Caporoz been earning wages instead of workers compensation benefits, his estate would
have been entitled to them. But for the Defendant's withholding of Applicant's benefits, his
dependents would have enjoyed and depended upon those benefits, just as they did the wages,
when he was earning them. Why then would his estate not be entitled to at least the total
temporary benefits which had already accrued at the time of his death?
The applicant was mortally injured on May 17, 1994. He did not pass away until
December 17, 1994. Thus, the Deceased's temporary total disability payments were earned. The
fact that Defendants did not pay these benefits when they were due and that the Applicant died
before his case was heard by the Industrial Commission should not create an unfair and improper
14

windfall for the Defendants at the expense of the deceased's heirs. The Parker court stated:
The fact that by accident a warrant had not been issued or there had been a failure
to pay him should not inure to the benefit of the parties who should have paid the
compensation. The law will consider that done which should have done and not
permit those who are obligated and should have paid the compensation to obtain
the advantage of a fortuitous circumstance. Because the warrant was not made
out and delivered to him cannot in logic, injustice, or in reason affect the right of
his personal representative to collect the compensation nor relive the employer or
the state insurance fund of the obligation to pay it.
The Industrial Commission and Administrative Law Judge have certain duties and
responsibilities to make appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The "Industrial Commission must always weigh any conflicting evidence, carefully
considering all factors, without giving particular deference to either side". In IHC v. Board of
Review, 839 P.2d 841 (1992), the Court of Appeals requires that "determinations regarding
factual circumstances surround industrial injury must be ruled on by Administrative Law Judge.
In Adams, the Court of Appeals has indicated that the Agency "must make findings of
fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate review".
The failure to disclose specific subsidiary findings may or may not be fatal to agency's decision,
where agency's findings reveal steps taken by agency in reaching its decision. In this case, there is
no method of how either Judge George or the Industrial Commission determined that Petitioners
were not dependents taking into consideration their findings.
In Price River Coal Co v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (1986), the inadequacy
of administrative law judge's findings justified remanding the matter back to the hearing level for
resolution of conflicting testimony, findings and determination. This case should be remanded for
further hearings.. One that will properly enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
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In reviewing the Findings of Fact, one can only come to the conclusion that the Petitioners
were in fact partially dependent upon the Deceased and that Temporary Total Disability
Compensation had accrued since the date of the accident up to Decedent's demise.

CONCLUSION
Applicants are dependents of the Deceased. They fall into the statutory category under
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-71 as both Applicants are sisters to the Deceased. The Applicants relied
upon Deceased's support and maintenance. It was reasonable for Deceased to provide the
financial assistance. The Deceased and Applicants would have enjoyed future support and
assistance had the Deceased not past away. Applicants, therefore, should be entitled to benefits
under the Utah Workers Compensation Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68.
The Applicants should be entitled to the Temporary Total Disability Compensation as they
are dependents of the Deceased. The TTD had accrued and was payable according to the
Industrial Commission rules and 35-1-65. To rule otherwise would be unfair and create an
improper windfall to the Defendants.

Dated this 3 5 day of March, 1997.

^ ^

^s

David W. Parker
Attorney for Petitioners/Appellants
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

VERNA CAPOROZ & ROXSANNE
CLASTIMODO, Sisters of BARNEY
CAPOROZ (Deceased)
Plaintiff(s)

)
)
)
)
)

v.
•

GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ and/or
MARGARET RODRIGUEZ and/OR
WILLIE RODRIGUEZ and/or TIM
FRAGA dba HANDYMAN WILLIE

)

•

)
)
)
)

Case No:95415
Judge: Donald L. George

^ u u u i M i i c u j , u i N i i N o u r o : u XLivir i_v^ i JCIVO

FUND
Defendant(s)
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 27, 1995 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. same
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicants, Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimado, were
represented by David W. Parker, Attorney at Law.
The respondent, Uninsured Employers' Fund was represented by Sharon J.
Eblen, Attornev
The respondents, Guillermo Rodriguez, Margaret Rodriguez, Willie
Rodriguez, Tim Fraga dba handyman Willie, did not appear.

This case involves a claim for medical and burial expenses for xK€7Jecedent^fiarney\ -^
Caporoz and dependents benefits for his sister Verna Caporoz and his h^sister Ro#Sanne[S «i
Clastimado (hereafter known as sisters). Roxsanne Clastimado was joined as an applicant at the
hearing upon motion of her attorney. The Uninsured Employers1 Fund did not object to joinder.
Following the hearing, a conference call was held between Judge Donald L. George David W.
Parker and Sharon Eblen. Ms. Eblen was ordered by Judge Donald L. George to prepare up
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Mr. Parker objected to said proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and forwarded his suggestions to Ms. Eblen. Ms. Eblen
could not agree on the new proposals. In said conference call, Judge Donald L. George then
ordered that Temporary Total Disability be paid to Barney Caporoz estate from May 8, 1994 to
December 17, 1994 and for burial expenses. A second conference call was initiated by Judge
Donald L. George to David W. Parker. Ms. Eblen was located in chambers with Judge George.
At the second conference all, Judge George denied Temporary Total Disability benefits. Judge
George also found that there is not enough evidence to show insolvency of Defendants which can
be petitioned by Applicants at a later date. Questions also were raised on who were the
defendants. Judge George, prior to the hearing, and through his own investigation found that
Willie Rodriguez a.k.a. Guillermo Rodriguez was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. Judge
George also called the former phone number of Handyman Willie and talked with Margaret
Rodriguez and Tim Fraga. It was Judge George's impression that Margaret Rodriguez and Tim
Fraga were operating Handyman Willie. Judge George then sua sponte named them as defendants
and notice was provided to them of the hearing.
The respondent employer. Guillermo Rodriguez a.k.a. Willie Rodriguez dha Handyman
Willie did not appear at the hearing and default was entered against him at that time. Margaret
Rodriguez and Tim Fraga were also notified of the hearing and did not appear and therefore
default was entered against them at that same time. The Uninsured Employers' Fund did not
dispute the claim or Defendant Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret Rodriguez and/or Willie
Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman Willie's liability for medical bills, and burial
expenses, up-to the statutory maximum of 54,000.00. The only dispute to be resolved at the
hearing was whether the sisters of Barney Caporoz were his partial dependents on the date of
decedent's industrial accident.
Because of a pending illness of Sharon Eblen, Judge Donald L. George requested that
Applicant's attorney draft up the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order following the
second conference call.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Barney Caporoz was injured in a compensable industrial accident in which he suffered

o

massive internal and external injuries to his head on May 7, 1994. He died as a result of
his injuries on December 17, 1994.

•

«•

*2

*! 2 «

On the date of his accident, Caporoz was working for W. Rodriguez, dba Handyman
Willie earning an average weekly wage of S225.00 per week, therefore theTcmporary
Total Disability rate would be SI 50.00.
Presently W. Rodriguez is serving a sentence at the Utah State Prison.
Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimado, sisters of Barney Caporoz, moved to Utah
from Hawaii and shared a home. They moved to Ogden from Salt Lake City when Verna
went to work at IOMEGA.
At that time they rented the three bedroom home in Ogden in the amount of S275.00 per
month.
Verna paid the expenses to move into the house in Ogden (deposit, etc).
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needed assistance and support to pay the rent and other expenses.
In order to remain in the home, Barney Caporoz moved in with them to share expenses.
The applicants testified they could not afford to move.
When Barney moved in with his sisters, his sisters owned one bed, a dining room set with
three chairs and some dishes.
Barney bought himself a waterbed and some couches and other furniture for the family.
The three siblings purchased a television set. Barney paid for cable T. V.
While Barney lived with his sisters, they purchased three vehicles, all registered to Verna
Caporoz. Insurance on the vehicles was SI06.00 per month.
3

13.

Barney Caporoz paid for all recreation and vacations including several trips to Lagoon,
*°Z «% >'* »>? " J
Raging Waters, and Wendover. Barney also maintained the cars*$nd hpme tit order Idl 2
reduce expenses.

14.

Verna paid $175.00 per month toward rent and bills plus $40.00 per month on expenses.
Barney paid a total of $400.00 per month toward rent and bills ($150.00 towards rent).
Roxsanne paid $75.00 per month towards rent and about $30.00 for food. Barney paid
out of his own pocket for all other food for the family.

15.

Utilities such as electricity, water, sewer and trash pick up were included in the rent.

16.

Each sibling paid his or her own portion of the telephone bill. They siblings purchased a
pearl necklace and bracelet for their mother at Zales on Verna's credit card. Barney
sometimes bought clothes on Verna's JC Penney credit card.

17.

At the time of his death, Barney Caporoz was earning 5225.00 per week. Verna Caporoz
was earning 5220.00 per week and Roxsanne Clastimodo was earning 5170.00 per week.

18.

At the time of Barney's death, he was 33 years old, Verna was 35 years old and Roxsanne
was 30 years old.

19.

Verna quit her job after Barney was injured in May 1994 and was unemployed until
September 1994 to tend to him.

20.

Verna is currently working and earning 51500.00 per month before taxes. Roxsanne is
currently working 20 hours per week at minimum wage.

21.

Verna testified that she is currently paying off personal debt at a rate of 5250.00 to
$275.00 per month.

22.

After Barney's injury, the cable T. V. and phone were cut off and they had to sell their
4

furniture, cars, T.V., beds and washer and dryer.
• . • % i 1 » • '•> ••>

23.

Barney paid for vacations for himself and his sisters. The appiiga$ts can no longer j&ffojd
to take vacations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

. —

The applicants, Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimado, were not partial dependents of
their brother, Barney Caporoz. Accordingly, they are not entitled to payment of dependent's
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Section 35-1-68, U.C.A.
The Defendants, Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret Rodriguez and/or Willie
Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman Willie, are liable to pay all medical expenses resulting
from the industrial accident and burial expenses up to the statutory maximum of $4,000.00,
pursuant to Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-68, U.C.A.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the applicants* claim for death benefits based upon
partial dependency is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that default is entered against defendants Guillermo
Rodriguez and/or Margaret Rodriguez and/or Willie Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman
based upon their failure to answer the application for benefits and failure to appear at the hearing
after proper notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret
Rodriguez and/or Willie Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman Willie shall pay all medical
expenses reasonably related to Barney Caporoz' industrial accident of May 7, 1994. Said medical
expenses have been submitted to the Uninsured Employers Fund. Said payment includes
5

reimbursement to Medicaid for the amounts expended.
m i S FURTHER ORDERED the defendants, Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret
Rodriguez, and/br Willie Rodriguez and/or 11m Frage dba Handyman Willie reimburse the estate
of BarneyiCaporoz for burial expenses for Barney Caporoz up to the statutory maximum of
S4,000.00ito the estate of Barney Caporoz.
ITIIS FURTHER ORDERED that any Morion for Review of the foregoing shall bc-filed
in writing hvithiri thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections and, unless so filed, this Order shall befinaland not subject to review or appeal. In
the* event a Motion for Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing wath the Commission, in which to file a written response with the Commission in
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
That this Order shall be construed as constituting an "Award" within the meaning of r A.Utah Workers* Compensation and Occupational Disease and Disability Act, generally^ and I s :.A.:
Section 3i-l-44*(7) (1953) and U.C.A. Section 35-01-78 (1981). inter alia, specifically.
Dated: this £ i £ _ cay of APRIL J996.

^

^

^

4

^

Honorable Donald L. George
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% certify that on April <3 , 1996- a copy was of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law a ™i Order, in the case of
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Verna Caporoz
2176 North 4500 West
Plain City, UT 84404

Ti*& Fraga/Handyman Willie
27*9 Adams Avenue
oqten, UT 84401

Roxsanne Clastimodo
2176 North 4500 West
Plain City, UT 84404
David W. Parker
Attorney at Law
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Scott Jensen
Attorney at Law
205 26th Street, #34
Ogden, UT 84401
Sharon Eblen
Attorney at Law
Uninsured Employers Fund
P.O. Box 146612
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Guillersio D. Rodriguez
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Willie Rodriguez
Margrett A. Rodriguez
651 28th Street
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
VERNA CAPOROZ and
ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO,
Sisters of BARNEY
CAPOROZ, deceased,

*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Applicants,
v
GUILLERMO
RODRIGUEZ
HANDY MAN
UNINSURED

*
*

RODRIGUEZ, Margaret
and TIM FRAGA, dba
WILLIE, and THE
EMPLOYERS' FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*

Case No. 95-0415

Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimodo ask The Industrial
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judgefs
decision denying cheir clairr. for dzzzr+zzr+zz' scncrits and tiie claim
of the estate of Barney Caporoz for temporary total disability
compensation under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The
Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for
review pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §3 5-182.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUS PR5SSNT5P
1) Were Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo dependents of Mr.
Caporoz and therefore entitled to the benefits provided by §35-1-73
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act").
2) Is Mr.
Caporoz' estate entitled to temporary total disability compensation
for the period between his accident and death? 3) Did the ALJ fail
to properly consider and resolve the factual and legal issues
presented by applicants' claim?
FINDINGS QF FACT
On May 17, 1994, while working for Kandy Man Willie, Mr.
Caporoz was injured by accident arising ouc of and in the course of
his employment. Mr. Caporoz died from his injuries on December 17,
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1994. At the time of his accident, Mr. Caporoz resided with his
sisters Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo.
My. Caporoz was 33 years old at the time of his death. Ms.
Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo were 35 and 30 years old, respectively.
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo had come to Utah from Hawaii
approximately six years earlier. They had first lived together in
Salt Lake City, then moved to Plain City. When Mr. Caporoz came to
Utah tiiree years later, he too lived in the Plain City home.
Mr. Caporoz and his sisters were each employed. Mr. Caporoz
and Ms. Caporoz earned approximately the same income while Ms.
Clastimodo earned somewhat less. He paid $400 per month as his
share of rent and other basic household expenses. His contribution
was placed in his sisters1 checking account, as were his sisters'
earnings. Ms. Caporoz then paid rent and other household expenses
out of this checking account. Such expenses included rent at $400
per mcntJk, automobile insurance oZ $105 pci muuLii, payments on some
charge accounts, and other household needs.
i
in addition to Mr. Caporoz' monthly payment toward household
expenses, he purchases food items that were shared with his
sisters. He also paid for cable television service and his share
of long distance telephone charges. He occasionally provided his
sisters with money for movies. On several occasions he paid for
travel and lodging in Wendcver, Nevada and for day trips to Lagoon
Amusement Park.
!

At the time Mr. Caporoz joined his sisters, they already owned
some furniture, including table and chairs, beds, loveseat, two
living room chairs and a television set. They also had basic
household items such as dishes, utensils and pans necessary for
their home. After Mr. Caporoz arrived, he purchased several items
of second-hand furniture, including a bed for himself, a couch and
other living room furniture. The family acquired two used motor
vehicles in addition to the automobile Ms. Caporoz already owned.
immediately after Mr. Caporoz was injured at work, Ms. Caporoz
quit her job in order to be with her brother an the hospital. She
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remained off work for five months, during which time she and her
sister fell behind on their financial obligationsThey were
compelled to sell various items of personal property. Now that Ms.
Caporoz has returned to work, she and her sister are meeting their
current obligations and are slowly repaying their accumulated debt.
They continue to reside in the Plain City home.
On May 5, 1995, Ms. Caporoz filed a claim for dependent's
benefits and burial expense with the Industrial Commission. It
does not appear that any claim was ever filed on behalf of Mr.
Caporoz for temporary total disability compensation for the period
between his injury and death.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
I,

DEPENDENTS/ BENEFITS;

When an accident causes the death of a worker, §35-1-68(5)(b)
of the Act provides survivors' benefits to family members1 who were
dependent on the deceased worker for their support. • In this case,
the parties agree that Mr. Caporoz' death arose out of and in the
course of his employment at Handy Man Willies. The only issue in
dispute is.whether Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo were partially
dependent upon Mr. Caporoz for their support.
...Ms..,..Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo 'bear the burden of ..proving
dependency,2 which is a question of fact that must be made on a
case by case basis. They must establish that they relied upon the
deceased worker for support, that had the deceased worker not been

1

Those family members eligible for survivors' benefits are
identified in ^35-1-71 of the Act and include sisters and half
sisters.
2

Minor children, disabled children and surviving spouses are
generally presumed to be dependent, pursuant to §35-1-71 of the
Act." However, no presumption of dependency exists with respect to
surviving siblings.
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killed, the applicants would have continued to receive some
assistance, and that it was reasonable necessary for the deceased
worker to render aid to the applicants to allow them to maintain
their accustomed standard of living. Famsvnrth v. Industrial
Commission/ 534 P.2d 897, 899 (1975), citing Pigby v. Industrial
Commission. 75 Utah 454, 286 P. 628 (1930).
Applying the foregoing test to the facts of this case, the
Industrial^Commission concludes~Ms:"Caporoz and..Ms".".Clastimodo have
n^restablished "they were dependent upon Mrv.-.Caporoz within the
meaning"of'".'S35-1-68 of the Act. While Mr;--.Caporoz "carried his
share ~~of .household .expenses/ he did .not subsidize his -sisters'
^elcpenses. To the contrary, it appears that Mr. Caporoz and his
sisters had^deyeloped a system of sharing common expenses, but. that*'
each of them paid their own personal expenses. While Mr. Caporoz
may have occasionally treated his sisters to movies, admission to
Lagoon or lodging and meals at Wendover, the Industrial Commission
aoes not consiaer sucn items as significant to the support and
maintenance of Ms. Caporoz or Ms. Clastimodo.
The Industrial Commission also concludes that Mr. Caporoi'
financial participation was not necessary for Ms. Caporoz and Ms.
Clastimodo to maintain their standard of living. It*appears that
the financial difficult suffered by Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo
after their brother's injury resulted from the fact that Ms.
Caporoz stopped working, rather than the loss of support from Mr.
Caporoz.
In light of the
the determination of
were not dependent
dependents' benefits
TT.

foregoing, the Industrial Commission affirms
the ALJ that Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo
upon Mr. Caporoz and are not entitled to
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

T^MPOPAPV TOTAL DISABILITY COMPOSITION-

Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo ask the Industrial Commission
to order payment of temporary total disability compensation to Mr.
Caporoz' estate for the period between Mr. Caporoz' accident and
his death. The Industrial Commission is unaware that any claim for
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temporary total disability compensation was filed prior to Mr.
Caporoz' death. IJtT^i^^e^
made prior^o^Ms^deathl Under such circumstances, the decision of
tHeTutahT Supreme Court in Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v,
Industrial Commission. 218 P.2d 970, 974 (1950), is controlling:
The right to compensation for injuries is a right
personal to the employee and unless payments have accrued
or a determination has been made by the Commission there
is no right;to which the personal representative or a
dependent can succeed.;
Because no temporary total disability compensation accrued to
MrT^Caporoz before his" death, amy claim he might have had to such
compensation expired with his death. Therefore, the ALJ ..correctly
declined " to order payment of temporary total disability
compensation to Mr. Caporoz' estate.
Ill, ALJ'S CONSIDERATION OF DISPUTSS OF FACT AND LAW;
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo contend that the ALJ improperly
deferred to the analysis and arguments of the Uninsured Employers'
Fund, thereby failing to weigh and resolve factual and legal issues
according to his own judgment.
The Industrial Commission finds no merit to this argument. It
is the written decision, signed and issued by the ALJ, which must
be taken as the ALJ's final judgment in this case. Even if the
contents of a decision have been suggested by the evidence and
arguments of a party, the ALJ manifested his own judgment by
signing the decision. Of course, the decision must properly apply
the law and be supported by the evidence. Any.party believing the
decision Jto be deficient may obtain review by the Industrial
Commission, which has authority to modify the ALJ's findings of
fact and application of law.
In this case, the Industrial
Commission has reviewed the testimony, documentary record and
arguments of the parties. Based on that review, the Industrial
Commission agrees with the ALJ's determination.
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ORDER
The Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's decision and
denies Vis. Caporo* 3tod Ms. Clast-iTnodo* s motion iox review. It, is
so ordered.

NOTICE OF APPSAL RIgHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by
the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such
petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MftlLINS
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of Barney Caporoz Case No. 95-0415 was
mailed first class postage prepaid thisB^$ffi day of October, 1996,
to the following^:
DAVID W. PARKER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
BANK ONE TOWER, SUITE 900
50 WEST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-1218
TIM FRAGA
276 9 ADAMS AVENUE
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
VERNA CAPOROZ
2176 NORTH 400 WEST
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UTAtt
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ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO
2176 NORTH 4500 WEST
PLAIN CITY, UTAH 84404
SHARON E3LEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
P O BOX 146612
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GUILLERMO D. RODRIGUEZ
P O BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020
WILLIE RODRIGUEZ
MARGARET A. RODRIGUEZ
651 28TH STREET *
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
Adell Butljer-Mitchell
Support Specialist
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Utah Code §35-1-86

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 35. LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions

§ 35-1-86. Court of Appeals may review commission's actions
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order.
As last amended by Chapter 72, Laws of Utah 1988.

REPEAL
< Repealed by Laws 1996, c. 240, § 376, effective July 1, 1997 >
Search this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt.
works.
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Utah Code §35-1-71

|
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 35. LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS 1 COMPENSATION
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions

§ 35-1-71. Dependents—Presumption
< Text effective until July 1,1997 >
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over if physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent uponl
the parent, with whom they are living at the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally bound for their |
support.
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under Subsection 35-1-68 (2)(a)(i), a surviving husband or wife
shall be presumed to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the
employee's death.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with
the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury or death of such employee, except for
purposes of dependency reviews under Subsection 35-1-68 (2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears the relation of
husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall
include a posthumous child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half sisters
shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used.
As last amended by Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1987.

< For text as renumbered and amended effective July 1, 1997, see § 35A-3-403 >
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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Utah Code §35-1-68
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 35. LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions

§ 35-1-68. Employers' Reinsurance Fund—Injury
Payments to dependents

causing death—Burial

expenses-

< Text effective until July 1, 1997 >
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making payments for industrial
accidents or occupational diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994. The payments shall be made in
accordance with Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for
industrial accidents or occupational diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. This fund shall succeed to
all monies previously held in the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund." or the "Second Injury Fund."
Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund"
that reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the
custodian of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions for and direct its
distribution. Reasonable costs of administration or other fees may be paid from the fund.
(2) The state treasurer shall:
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assessments from the State Tax Commission; and
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to ensure maximum investment return for both long and short
term investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5.
(3) The commission may employ or retain counsel to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in
proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon request of the commission, the
attorney general shall aid in representation of the fund.
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, elected or appointed officials, or
other duly authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, medical
expenses, or disbursement properly chargeable against the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, is limited to the
cash or assets in the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and they are not otherwise, in any way, liable for the
operation, debts, or obligations of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
(5) If injury causes death within a period of 312 weeks from the date of the accident, the employer or
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
*9923 (a)(i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment by the employer
or its insurance carrier shall be 66- 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but
not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt.
works.
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less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent minor
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 85% of the state
average wreekly wage at the time of the injury per week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for
the remainder of the period between the date of the death and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of the
injury.

I
(ii) The payment by the employer or its insurance carrier to wholly dependent persons during dependency
following the expiration of the first 312-week period described in Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be an amount
equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during that initial 312-week period,
reduced by 50% of any weekly federal Social Security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
I

(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at the end of the initial
312-week period and annually thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts and
circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may
be considered a partly dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission
may determine under Subsection (5)(b)(ii).
I
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall be
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a 312-week period from the date of death of the employee.
This presumption shall not apply after the initial 312-week period and, in determining the then existing
annual income of the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal Social Security
death benefits received by that surviving spouse.
|
(b)(i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall be 66- 2/3% of the
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week.
Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of death
and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may determine.
Compensation may not amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this!
subsection shall be in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of
injury7, and any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection shall be consistent with the general
provisions of this title.
*9924 (ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent under Subsection (5)(a)(iii) shall be
determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency7 existing at
the time of the dependency review and may be paid in an amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate
that partly dependent persons would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their dependency by the employer or
its insurance carrier.
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons at the time of death, the
commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits
awarded to all parties concerned do not exceed the maximum provided for by law.
As last amended by Chapter 266, Laws of Utah 1994.
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Excerpt from page 6515 follows
Pleadings and Discovery.

A. For the purposes of > Section 63-46b-3, U.C.A., all adjudicative proceedings for
workers' compensation and occupational disease claims shall only be commenced by the injured
worker or dependent filing a request for agency action with the Commission. The Administrative
Law Judge is afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to > Section
63-46b-9, U.C.A. The Application for Hearing is the request for agency action. All such
applications shall include supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a
dispute over medical issues. Applications without supporting documentation will not be mailed
to the employer or insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have been
provided.
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance
carrier, the burden rests on the applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application for
Hearing with the Commission.
C
When an Application for Hearing is filed with the Commission, the Commission shall
forthwith mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days following the date of the mailing
of the application to file a written answer with the Industrial Commission, admitting or denying
liability for the claim. The answer should state all affirmative defenses with sufficient
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense
asserted. All answers shall include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on
the claim. A copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, to the applicant's
attorney by the defendant.
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an answer within the 30 days
provided above, the Commission may enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier.
The Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and
enter an Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by following the
procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the
defendant employer or insurance carrier and shall not be construed to deprive the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses.
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F. Where the answer denies liability solely on the medical aspects of the case, the
applicant, through his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the
approval of the Commission or its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of facts,
which stipulation, together with the medical documents bearing on the case in the Commission's
file, may be used in making the final determination of liability.
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its representatives may have a pre-hearing or
post-hearing conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with appropriate sets of
interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past
and present medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical
releases to allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also require the
applicant to submit to an independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in the
dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery proceedings and must be signed,
unless good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled
hearing.
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance carrier as a single
joint exhibit at least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and
submit all pertinent medical records contained in his file to the employer or its insurance
carrier for the joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits
are to be placed in an indexed binder arranged by care provider in chronological order.
Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records with the exception of hospital nurses
notes.
K. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified one week in advance of any proceeding
where it is anticipated that more than four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated

that the hearing of the evidence will require more than two hours.
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding will be issued in
accordance with the provisions of > Section 63-46b-5 or > 63-46b-10, U.C.A.
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review of an Order by the Agency may
file a written request for review in accordance with the provisions of > Sections 63-46b-12,
63-46b- 13, > 63-46b-14, > 63-46b-15, and > 63-46b-16, U.C.A. A Motion for Review of any order
entered by an Administrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the provisions of > Section
63-46b-12, U.C.A. Unless so filed, the Order will become the award of the Commission and will be
final. If appropriately filed, the Administrative Law Judge may:
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1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and
receiving such further evidence as may be deemed necessary, 2. Amend or modify the prior Order
by a Supplemental order, or
3.

Refer the entire case to the Commission for review under > Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A.

If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided above, it shall be
final unless a Motion for Review of the same is filed with the Commission.
N. In
Utah Rules
Utah Rules
U.C.A., or

formal adjudicative proceedings, the Industrial Commission shall generally follow the
of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of > Section 35-1-88,
as may be otherwise modified by the presiding officer.

0. A request for reconsideration of a Commission's Order on Motion for Review may be
allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of > Section 63-46b-13, U.C.A. Any petition for
judicial review of the Commission's Order on Motion for Review shall be governed by the
provisions of > Section 63-46b-14, U.C.A.
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Excerpt from page 6521 follows
Interest.

A. Interest must be paid on each benefit payment which comprises the award from the date
that payment would have been due and payable at the rate of 8% per annum.
B. For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits shall become ""due and payable'1 (as
used in > Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows:
1. Temporary total compensation shall be due and payable within 21 days of the date of the
accident.
2. Permanent partial compensation shall be due and payable on the next day following the
termination of a temporary total disability. However, where the condition is not fixed for
rating purposes, the interest shall commence from the date the permanent partial impairment can
be medically determined.
3. Permanent partial or permanent total disability compensation payable by the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be due and payable as soon as reasonably
practical after an order is issued.
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